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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an optional bonus-malus contract based on a pri-
ori risk classiﬁcation of the underlying insurance contract. By inducing
self-selection, the purchase of the bonus-malus contract can be used as
a screening device. This gives an even better pricing performance than
both an experience rating scheme and a classical no-claims bonus system.
An application to the Danish automobile insurance market is considered.
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1INTRODUCTION
If one tells the truth, one is sure, sooner or later, to be found
out.
Oscar Wilde
In a world with two levels of risk and asymmetric information, where the
insurance company cannot distinguish between customers from the two risk
groups, there is no pooling equilibrium and there may not be an equilibrium at
all (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). In a pooling equilibrium, the lower risk poli-
cyholders subsidize the higher risk policyholders. If the policyholders are aware
of their risks and the diﬀerence is too large between risk and price, the lower
risk individuals will not buy insurance. Thus, either the market for insurance
breaks down or each type of policyholder buys an insurance contract with a
payoﬀ that caters to the speciﬁc riskiness of the policyholder. This idea of suﬃ-
ciently tailor-made (i.e. diﬀerentiated) contracts may not ﬁt exactly with what
we see in current insurance markets. Insurance contracts oﬀered by insurance
companies are only to some extent diﬀerentiated, depending on the sophistica-
tion of the models, the available data and regulations. However, Allard et al.
(1997) show that pooling equilibria may exist if even the slightest distributional
cost exists. Diﬀerences in risk aversion can also make policyholders with diﬀer-
ent risks accept pooling (at least to some extent), according to Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976).
Covariate-based regression is generally used to diﬀerentiate pricing and the
most widely used models for this are generalized linear models (GLM); see
Pinquet (2001) for applications in actuarial science and McCullagh and Nelder
(1989) for a general discussion of the statistical theory of GLMs. One way to im-
prove the a priori pricing is to make use of a posteriori corrections based on ex-
perience rating, such as credibility theory and bonus-malus systems (BMS). Sim-
ple time-independent credibility models with extensions to both time-dependence
and multivariate experience rating are found in Pinquet et al. (2001) and En-
glund et al. (2009). Brouhns et al. (2003) provide a quick survey of diﬀerent
types of BMS. Unfortunately, these experience-based methods have a limited
impact when individual claim information is rare, as for new policyholders, and
it may take several years of observation before the precision is reasonable. How-
ever, Donnelly et al. (2013) ﬁnds evidence of adverse selection within the Danish
automobile insurance market, meaning that the degree of coverage chosen by
the policyholder is based on the ex ante assessment that a policyholder makes
of his riskiness and wealth. Therefore we seek new ways to diﬀerentiate the
policyholders by risk at the very outset, i.e. at the time of purchase of the
insurance product.
This paper gives examples of an insurance contract which may induce self-
selection within the existing risk classes of the rating scheme. The new type of
insurance contract has some features that are not found in contracts of standard
BMS. Similarly to BMS, the payoﬀ that is oﬀered to policyholders depends on
the actual number of experienced claims during each insurance period, but the
contract has a more general form of payoﬀ than a standard contract with bonus.
The payoﬀ can be tailor-made to individual policyholders’ needs or preferences.
Implicit in this is the idea that insurance companies should oﬀer a menu of
2contracts in such a way that self-selection is induced among the policyholders.
Hence, we allow for an extended individual choice compared to standard BMS.
With such a contract the insurer will be able to diﬀerentiate the insurance
premium for each period of time to an even greater extent, which makes it
more competitive due to the separating eﬀect. This is desirable since adverse
selection can cause ineﬃciency in insurance contracts, reducing the beneﬁt of
taking an insurance for the lower classes of risk since the price will be too high
in relation to the risk (Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Stiglitz,
1977). For recent contributions on the subjects of asymmetric information,
adverse selection, deductibles and bonus systems, see Snow (2009), Spreeuw
and Karlsson (2009) and Kim et al. (2009).
We use policyholder and claims data from a Danish insurance company to
investigate the hypothesis that such a contract will in fact induce self-selecting
behavior, in addition to the decision of buying the insurance, at the diﬀerenti-
ated prices of the rating scheme. Other recent approaches to assessing individual
customer risk and relating it to pricing are Guill´ en et al. (2012) and Thuring
et al. (2012).
The paper is arranged as follows. In the section titled “The New Insurance
Contract”, a heterogeneity model for the data and the new insurance contract
are deﬁned. “Comparison of the Add-On to Other Pricing Methods” gives
the ﬁrst numerical study, as well as describing the data set and the pricing
methods used to measure the pricing precision of the new insurance contract.
In the section titled “Individual Choice and Self-Selection”, we investigate the
eﬀects of individual choice on the pricing precision, based on an expected utility
representation and private information. We ﬁnish with “Conclusion.”
THE NEW INSURANCE CONTRACT
First, a model for insurance claims when policyholders are heterogeneous is
presented. Second, the insurance contract is introduced to exhibit features useful
for inducing self-selection among insurance customers. Finally, we illustrate the
eﬃciency of the proposed insurance contact using Danish automobile insurance
data.
The usual assumptions used in models on adverse selection are maintained in
this paper: individual information is costly to observe by the insurer, neither the
frequency nor the claim size are functions of the actions of the policyholders, the
provision of the insurance is costless and the insurer is risk-neutral while the
policyholders are risk-averse, having the same twice-diﬀerentiable, increasing
and strictly-concave utility function U.
A Model for Heterogeneous Policyholders
Let us consider the number of claims, Nij, for individual i ∈ {1,...,I} in in-
surance period j ∈ {1,...,Ji} on one particular coverage (i.e. a product). We
consider one coverage at a time and assume that the events in diﬀerent coverages
are independent. We assume that every policyholder has a latent individual risk
proﬁle θi, which summarizes the informational asymmetry and is a realization
of a positive random variable Θi. The latent variable Θi is considered to be a
random eﬀect for the insurer but known by the policyholder.
3Conditional on Θi = θi, the number of claims Nij is assumed to be Poisson
distributed with expectation νijθi, in which νij > 0 allows for the insurer’s
prior knowledge about the individual i in time period j. Speciﬁcally, denoting
by xij ∈ Rk a column vector of covariates, such as age, sex, geographical area,
or other relevant variables, and by ωij the duration of period j covered for
policyholder i, then
νij = ωij exp
￿
a⊤xij
￿
,
in which the constant a ∈ Rk is a column vector of parameters and a⊤ denotes
the transpose of a. When covariates are used to price insurance, it is assumed
that individuals with the same characteristics have the same risk. However,
the introduction of an individual risk proﬁle into the model means that poli-
cyholders with the exact same set of covariates may diﬀer in risk due to un-
observable characteristics. Examples of these unobservable characteristics for
automobile insurance may be aggressiveness while driving and the temperament
of the driver.
The pairs (Θ1,N1j),(Θ2,N2j),...,(ΘI,NIj) are independent random vectors,
where Θ1,Θ2,... are independent and identically distributed (iid) random vari-
ables with E(Θi) = 1 and Var(Θi) = τ2.
Since we will only consider full coverage insurances in what comes next, the
cost of claims will not aﬀect the individual decision rules or choices. Hence, we
consider only the number of claims Nij rather than the aggregate cost of the
claims made by individual i in insurance period j.
Suppose that the insurer wishes to price the contract at the actuarially fair
value. If the latent individual risk proﬁle θi is observable by each policyholder
and insurer, then we have symmetric information. In that case, the insurance
contract is simple: in each period the insurer oﬀers to cover all losses for each
individual against an insurance premium
µij (θi) := E(Nij | Θi = θi) = νijθi.
However, when the insurer cannot observe the latent individual risk proﬁle
θi, the actuarially fair value of the insurance premium is
µij := E(µij(Θi)) = νijE(Θi) = νij.
In the latter case of asymmetric information, there is no adjustment to the
insurance premium for the individual’s risk proﬁle. In the following section we
propose a way to enable the insurer to gain information about the individual’s
risk proﬁle θi.
The Add-On to the Standard Insurance Contract
Now we consider an add-on to the standard insurance contract, which allows
for the policyholder’s individual risk proﬁle θi. To keep the discussion simple,
we assume that the discount rate is zero1.
In addition to the premium µij, policyholder i who accepts the add-on will
pay an entrance fee πij > 0. If the policyholder makes no claims during the
insurance period j, the insurer will pay an amount πij+dij to the policyholder, in
1Lazar and Denuit (2012) is a recent analysis of the relationship of premiums with interest
rates, among other variables.
4which the constant dij > 0 is called the dividend. In other words, a policyholder
who makes no claims during the insurance period j gets back their entrance
fee plus a dividend at the end of the insurance period j. If the policyholder
makes one claim or more, then the insurer pays nothing to the policyholder in
respect of the add-on (although the cost of the claims made under the standard
insurance contract are covered as usual). The add-on to the standard insurance
contract has a binary nature: either policyholder i gets the payment πij + dij
at the end of insurance period j, or they do not.
We focus our analysis on the simplest (one-period) setting in which the add-
on is a one-period contract. Policyholders decide at the start of the insurance
period whether or not to accept the add-on, and the contingent payment made
at the end of the insurance period is distinct from the premium that would be
paid in the next insurance period. Extensions of this simple setting are discussed
in the following subsection, “Discussion of the Add-On.”
We assume that the contingent payment πij + dij is made directly to poli-
cyholder i at the end of the insurance period j. In a more realistic setting, it
may be tax-eﬃcient to reduce instead the insurance premium in the subsequent
insurance period by the amount of the contingent payment.2
The payments in the add-on could be re-structured so that the policyholder
pays nothing at the start of the insurance period. Then if policyholder i makes
no claims, they would receive a payment of dij from the insurer at the end of the
insurance period j. Otherwise, policyholder i pays πij to the insurer at the end
of the insurance period j. All of the results in our simple setting are identical
with this alternative payment structure. It also allows the identiﬁcation of the
payment dij as a bonus and the payment πij as a malus.
Howeverpaying the entrance fee πij up-front has the advantage of allowing us
to bypass punishment rules in environments where they are forbidden, such as in
some health insurance systems; for example, see Riedel (2006). The absence of a
reward at the end of the insurance period in the case where no-claims occur (i.e.
receiving nothing) replaces the punishment decision of the alternative payment
structure (i.e. having to pay a malus πij to the insurer). It may also be more
attractive way of framing the add-on to the policyholder (see Johnson et al.
(1993)). Note that BMSs come in many variants in real life, as well as in the
literature; for the latter, examples are Baione et al. (2002); Denuit et al. (2007);
Lemaire and Zi (1994); Lemaire (2006); Moreno et al. (2006); Pinquet (1997).
Mathematically, the payment from the add-on to policyholder i at the end
of insurance period j is represented by the random variable
Dij :=
￿
πij + dij if Nij = 0
0 if Nij > 0.
When making decisions regarding the add-on, the policyholder will take into
account their conditional probability of claims
pij (θi) := P(Nij > 0 | Θi = θi).
Thus the conditional distribution of Dij is
(Dij | Θi = θi) =
￿
πij + dij with probability 1 − pij(θi)
0 with probability pij(θi).
2Ulm (2012) considers the pricing of insurance contracts in a broader framework involving
tax.
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entrance fee πij and the dividend dij. The entrance fee, πij, can be set either
individually or collectively. This will be a strategic decision of the insurer and
something we discuss in the sequel.
The dividend dij is calculated in this paper via the actuarial net premium
principle; see Young (2006). The net premium principle is justiﬁable if we
can assume that volatility is essentially nonexistent, that is if the insurer sells
enough iid policies so that the Law of Large Numbers applies. However, the
dividend can be calculated via any other suitable principle, e.g. the expected
value premium principle: πij = (1 + ξ)E[Dij], for some ξ > 0.
Under the actuarial net premium principle, we set the entrance fee equal to
the expected payment from the add-on, i.e.
πij = E[Dij]. (1)
We assume that the insurer must oﬀer the add-on contract ex ante to the pol-
icyholder, with the amounts πij and dij ﬁxed at the start of insurance period
j. The insurer cannot change (πij,dij) during insurance period j in light of the
decision of policyholder i to accept the add-on or not. This does not preclude
the insurer from changing the risk classiﬁcation of policyholder i in subsequent
insurance periods, based on their decision to accept the add-on in the current
insurance period. We do not explore this interesting avenue of research in the
current paper. Instead our focus is on the pricing precision of the add-on within
the current insurance period. This is important to know, to see if there is a cost
to the insurer in oﬀering the add-on. In fact, our results show that the insurer’s
pricing precision may be increased signiﬁcantly by oﬀering the add-on.
Deﬁning the unconditional probability of claims of policyholder i in insurance
period j
pij := E[pij (Θi)],
the (unconditional) distribution of Dij is
Dij =
￿
πij + dij with probability 1 − pij
0 with probability pij.
Substituting E[Dij] = (1 − pij)(πij + dij) into (1), we get
dij
πij
=
pij
(1 − pij)
. (2)
Once the insurer has chosen πij, the value of the dividend dij is ﬁxed by the
above equation. Note that the insurer sets the dividend based on pij, the average
probability of making a claim. In comparison, the policyholder evaluates the
oﬀered contract based on their individual probability of making a claim, pij (θi).
Discussion of the Add-On
The add-on is a voluntary investment in addition to the original insurance con-
tract. The add-on should be appealing to the customer who is a better-than-
expected risk. Assuming this attractiveness is communicated to the customer,
it is then for the customer to judge if he is a better-than-expected type. In
this sense, there is a clear incentive from the customer’s perspective to reveal
6his private knowledge. Consequently, the add-on is linked more directly to the
economic discussion of asymmetric information than are classical BMSs.
Superﬁcially, it seems that our simple no-claims example is similar to a
“money-back” structure because money is paid out at the end of a claim-free
year. Indeed, in the one-period case, the add-on clause has many similarities to a
BMS. This can be seen by assuming a multi-period setting in which the payments
from the one-period add-on are paid only upon renewal of the insurance contract
in the subsequent insurance period. In that case, the add-on is not very diﬀerent
from a BMS in the long run.
However, when generalizing the basic idea of paying money upfront, i.e. the
entrance fee, to more complex pricing structures, such generalizations would
diﬀer fundamentally from other natural developments of a BMS. We could con-
struct an add-on that is a ﬁve-year or ten-year contract rather than a one-year
contract. A long-term contract gives the customer the full advantage of be-
ing a better-than-expected risk at the same time as providing a clear customer
loyalty situation for the company. Furthermore, the add-on does not have to
be restricted to the simple no-claims case. For example, one could introduce
a threshold such the customers can have claims paid out up to some amount
while still being in the class of customers getting a payout. Or one could simply
say that the customer pays his own claims with the revenue from the add-on
contract, as long as the revenue is large enough to pay the claims.
For example, suppose that the add-on is a ﬁve-year contract. At the start
of the ﬁve-year period, the customer pays the standard insurance premium and
the entrance fee. The entrance fee is calculated using the customer’s expected
experience over the ﬁve-year period, rather than on observed experience data.
During the ﬁve years, the standard insurance premium is adjusted using the
emerging experience. The new idea is that we adjust also a historically already-
paid premium. Aside from the initial entrance fee, the contract is structured
so that the customer does not pay any more in premiums than if he had not
bought the add-on. In other words, the buyer of the add-on cannot lose more
than the entrance fee. That leaves the insurance company with a risk for which
they charge an insurance premium in a similar way to the one-period case con-
sidered in this paper. The distinction of moral hazard and dynamic selection on
unobservables as analysed in Abbring et al. (2003b,a) based on observed data
might be further developed and improved while incorporating future data in the
consideration.
COMPARISON OF THE ADD-ON TO OTHER
PRICING METHODS
We want to compare the insurance contract with a one-year add-on against
diﬀerent pricing methods, using Danish automobile insurance data from 2001
to 2004. The accuracy of each pricing method is assessed by estimating the sum
of squared errors (SSE), across all individual policyholders. Here, the error is
deﬁned as the net payment made by the insurer to the policyholder during an
insurance period. The most eﬃcient pricing method is the one which has the
lowest SSE.
The idea behind using the SSE is that the insurer wants to break-even on
7each contract. A premium which is too low will result in an economic loss.
A premium which is too high will result in a loss of policyholders to another
insurer who is oﬀering a lower premium. More precisely, and since we only will
investigate the product portfolio of one insurer, we assume that the insurer is
a risk-neutral competitive specialist, whose expected proﬁt for each policy is
zero, as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985). The minimum SSE is expected in the
theoretical situation where each customer pays exactly his own claim costs to
the insurance company. Although the results below should clearly be interpreted
in light of this, a low SSE seems to be a reasonable description of the insurance
company’s optimization problem (B¨ uhlmann and Gisler, 2005).
Data Preparation and Model Validity
The data set that we analyze consists of I = 8337 policyholders in the per-
sonal lines portfolio of a Danish insurance company. The data set contains the
variables used by the pricing department at the insurance company for each
of the years during the period. For example, the covariates are: policyholder’s
demographic characteristics such as age, gender, geography; policyholder’s car
characteristics: brand, size of engine, model year, initial value of the car, com-
mercial vehicle or not, main vehicle or not.
The data set was selected from more than 375000 policyholders in the same
portfolio. Policyholders with missing values and obvious outliers were removed.
We chose the policyholders with exactly one automobile insurance policy, which
has full coverage, full duration for each year of the period 2001−2004 and with
no experience rating. In order to compare the classical no-claims bonus with
the add-on as far as possible, each policyholder has to fulﬁll the criteria of the
classical bonus, to the extent that the bonus is only dependent on the claim
experience. Therefore we further restricted our selection to policyholders who,
in addition to the automobile insurance, have purchased a building and personal
property insurance policy with full duration in the period 2001 − 2004.
The actual number of claims experienced for policyholder i in year j is de-
noted nij and, as all policies have full annual duration, ωij = 1. By a covariate-
based regression method (using GLM and maximum likelihood), we obtained
the estimated expected number of claims ˜ νij. However, in our data set there is
a diﬀerence between the total expected and total experienced number of claims
due to the pricing procedure, namely the rating scheme is estimated on all pol-
icyholders of the automobile portfolio, while we use only a subset of these. One
might suspect that policyholders with full duration in four consecutive years,
and who have purchased at least three insurance products, have a better claim
history than we expected, even though total duration (seniority) is not a sig-
niﬁcant variable in the rating scheme. Due to this diﬀerence and our interest
to investigate the performance of various pricing methods, we scaled the origi-
nal claim frequency estimates ˜ νij of the regression by multiplying each of them
by a factor
PI
i=1
P2003
j=2001 nij/
PI
i=1
P2003
j=2001 ˜ νij = 0.9164. These new claim
frequency estimates ˆ νij were then used to perform the analyses of this paper.
Table 1 summarizes the claim information for each year in the period 2001−
2004 for the data set of I = 8337 policyholders.
*** Insert Table 1 about here ***
8Empirically, we get a dispersion index of 1.33 for the data set which supports
the correctness in assuming a conditional Poisson distribution, i.e. assuming the
existence of an individual latent risk proﬁle.
Pricing Methods
We investigated ﬁve pricing methods for the insurance contract. The premiums
for the year 2004 were calculated based on the data in in years 2001−2003. The
premiums and the actual claims experience in 2004 were then used to calculate
the SSE for each method.
The ﬁve pricing methods, with their numerical index, are the following:
1. Flat rate. The mean value estimator, or the ﬂat rate, method with insur-
ance premium ˆ µ
(1)
ij . For this pricing method, the premium charged is
identical for all policyholders:
ˆ µ
(1)
ij := ˆ µ(1) :=
PI
i=1
P2003
j=2001 nij
PI
i=1
P2003
j=2001 ωij
.
The ﬂat rate method is the simplest possible estimator with an expected
non-negative proﬁt. Based on the data in years 2001 − 2003, we ﬁnd
ˆ µ(1) = 0.2091, meaning that, on average, there is approximately one claim
every ﬁfth year.
2. Regression. The covariate-based regression method with insurance pre-
mium ˆ µ
(2)
ij = ˆ νij. It is the pricing method used by the Danish insurance
company from whom we obtained the data and we use it as the baseline
pricing method.
3. Credibility. The experience rating method based on the one-dimensional
homogeneouscredibility estimator, with insurance premium ˆ µ
(3)
ij = ˆ µ
(2)
ij c θij.
B¨ uhlmann and Gisler (2005) provide an excellent survey on credibility the-
ory.
4. No-claims BMS. The classical, market-based, no-claims BMS with pre-
mium ˆ µ
(4)
ij . In this case, if certain critera are satisﬁed, the policyholder
is granted a bonus expressed as a percentage of the premium. The bonus
is given if the following criteria are fulﬁlled: the policy has a duration
of at least three years, no claims are reported during both the last three
years and the current insurance period. For the given data set, the bonus
is 10%. Normally, this requires that all policyholders pay 3 − 4% more
of the original actuarial premium up-front, in order that the portfolio is
ﬁnancially balanced. However, for the data subset of I = 8337 policy-
holders, the additional payment is 9.533%. The reason is due to the data
selection: every policyholder in the data subset is in the bonus system and
has the opportunity of getting a bonus. We lack the policyholders who
subsidize the bonus system by not having the opportunity of getting one.
Consequently the additional payment is higher.
5. Add-on. The standard insurance contract with an add-on. The premium
charged for the standard insurance contract is ˆ µ
(2)
ij and the entrance fee
9for the add-on is πij. In this section of the paper, we assume that all
policyholders buy the add-on, so that the total amount charged to poli-
cyholder i is ˆ µ
(5)
ij = ˆ µ
(2)
ij + πij. This assumption will be removed in the
section “Individual choice and self-selection”.
The dividend of the add-on is calculated for each policyholder i through
(2). This requires an estimator of pij = E[pij (Θi)]. First we expanded
pij (Θi) = 1 − e−νijΘi as a second-order Taylor series around E(Θi) = 1,
with a remainder term. Based on the data set, the empirical mean value
of the remainder term is negligible (it is less than 0.00175). Hence, taking
the expectation of the Taylor expansion, we assumed the expected value of
the remainder term was zero. The resulting estimator is ˆ pij = 1−e−νij −
1
2ν2
ije−νijτ2, in which τ2 := Var(Θi).
Figure 1 shows the distribution of ˆ ri,2004 := ˆ pi,2004/(1−ˆ pi,2004) in the data
set. The dividend is calculated as di,2004 = ˆ ri,2004 πi,2004 for each policy-
holder i. Thus each policyholder i is oﬀered an individually-determined
add-on, with entrance fee πi,2004 and dividend di,2004. We discuss below
the choice of the entrance fee.
A First Numerical Study
As we assume that the cost of claims Sij = 1, the SSE for pricing methods
l = 1,2,3,4 is deﬁned as
SSE (l,j) =
I X
i=1
￿
ˆ µ
(l)
ij − nij
￿2
. (3)
Due to the structure of the add-on, we calculate the SSE for l = 5 as
SSE (l = 5,j) =
I X
i=1
￿
ˆ µ
(5)
ij − nij − (dij + πij)1[nij = 0]
￿2
,
in which 1[nij = 0] equals one if nij = 0, and zero otherwise.
Instead of reporting the absolute values of the SSE, we use the scaled
SSE for each pricing method. It is calculated by dividing SSE (l,2004) by
SSE (2,2004), i.e. the SSE of the regression method, for each l = 1,...,5.
To ﬁx the entrance fee πi,2004 for the add-on, in this section we assume it
is a constant multiple of the premium ˆ µ
(2)
i,2004 charged for the standard insur-
ance contract to policyholder i. Investigating the scaled SSE for the interval
ˆ πi,2004/ˆ µ
(2)
i,2004 ∈ [0,5], we obtained Figure 2.
*** Insert Figure 2 about here ***
The minimum SSE for the add-on contract occurs at ˜ πi,2004 = 3.357ˆ µ
(2)
i,2004
across the data set. We used this choice of the entrance fee to compare the
pricing precision of the add-on contract with the other pricing methods. The
results are shown in Table 2.
*** Insert Table 2 about here ***
10The diﬀerence in performance of the ﬂat rate and the regression estimator
is quite important since it illustrates why insurance companies have pricing de-
partments. The credibility method, no-claims BMS method and add-on method
all use individual claim information. Therefore, they are expected to perform
better than the other two ones, as is borne out by the numerical results.
Table 2 shows that the credibility method gives an additional improvement of
25% over the regression method relative to the improvement due to moving from
the ﬂat rate method to the regression method. Even so, it is not as good as we
anticipated based on earlier studies, such as Englund et al. (2008) and Englund
et al. (2009). However, the performance of a pricing method also depends on
the type of coverage and data set. It may be that our data set is too limited;
four years may be too few to fully beneﬁt from the credibility approach.
In comparison, the performance of the no-claims BMS method is surprisingly
good. It gives an additional improvement of 54% over the regression method
compared with moving from the ﬂat rate method to the regression method.
It is also a rather simple method. These type of classical bonus systems are
however aﬄicted with some drawbacks regarding fairness and stability aspects.
Fairness: giving a ﬁxed percentage in bonus is advantageous for the expected
low-risk policyholders and disadvantageous for the expected high-risks compared
to their probability of reporting claims. However, if the insurer has a strategy
towards expected low-risks then it can be justiﬁed, or at least explained by, the
insurer. Stability: if all customers qualify for the bonus system (for example,
they purchase the required number of products), then the system would not be
stable, in the sense that the insurer will lose money if the initial extra payment is
not re-estimated. Remember that one of the fundamental principles of insurance
is that the policyholder should pay for the expected transferred risk, not the
outcome.
The add-on deals with these fairness and stability aspects while retaining the
advantages of simplicity and low requirements on information. It can perform
even better than both the credibility method and the 10% no-claims BMS,
depending on the choice of the entrance fee ˆ πij. The scaled SSE of the add-on
with the optimal entrance fee ˜ πi,2004 = 3.357ˆ µ
(2)
i,2004 is exceptionally low, and
it is almost 20 times the improvement of implementing the regression method
over the ﬂat rate method.
The drawback is that the optimal entrance fee is over three times the pre-
mium. It is doubtful that an average policyholder would pay the optimal en-
trance fee of more than three times their annual insurance premium up-front
and risk losing it all. For these reasons, and encouraged by the promising results
in Table 2, we extend our study to allow for the policyholders to choose whether
or not to buy the add-on.
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE AND SELF-SELECTION
In the previous section we saw that the pricing precision could be increased
by setting individual risk-based bonuses. However, the analysis was under the
assumption that all the policyholders bought the add-on, no matter how high
the entrance fee. Here we relax the assumption.
Each policyholder buys the standard insurance contract, and then decides
whether or not to buy the add-on. We expect that this will induce self-selection
11among policyholders within the same risk class of the rating scheme. The poli-
cyholders make their choice based on an expected utility decision rule, namely
they buy the add-on if it gives them a higher expected utility of wealth com-
pared to not buying the add-on. Thus we are introducing the individual risk
preferences of the policyholders.
As we are interested in the performance of the add-on both as a pricing
method and as a separating (self-selection) mechanism, we focus only on the
decision to buy the add-on or not, and ignore the decision on whether to buy
insurance or not. Moreover, for the numerical study below, the individuals in
the data set have already decided to buy insurance. As before, we assume a null
discount rate.
The Individual Decision Rule
Denote by wij the wealth of individual i at the start of insurance period j, i.e.
the initial wealth prior to the decision about insurance coverage. The initial
wealth consists of all the policyholder’s possessions including cash, ﬁnancial
assets, and the object that is insured. The policyholder is assumed to have
more wealth than the insured object and enough cash to pay the premium µij
of the standard insurance contract and the entrance fee πij, i.e. wij > πij +µij.
Although there is no need to have the “j” subscript in this section, we maintain
it here for consistency with the notation in the rest of the paper.
There are only two diﬀerent outcomes for the terminal wealth depending on
the binary decision on whether to buy insurance with or without an add-on.
The outcomes are summarized in Table 3.
*** Insert Table 3 about here ***
It follows that the policyholder will decide to buy the add-on if
EU (wij − µij − πij + Dij | Θi = θi) > U (wij − µij),
that is
pij(θi)U (wij − µij − πij) + (1 − pij(θi)) U (wij − µij + dij) > U (wij − µij).
(4)
We assume the policyholder to have a Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA) utility function. For w > 0, the CRRA utility function is deﬁned
as
U (w) =
(
w
1−γ
1−γ , γ  = 1,
ln(w), γ = 1.
The choice of CRRA ﬁnds support in Friend and Blume (1975), Pindyck (1988)
and Szpiro (1986). Friend and Blume conclude that an individual’s coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion is “on average well in excess of one and probably in excess
of two”, based on data on household asset holdings. Pindyck ﬁnds support for
a relative risk aversion coeﬃcient between 3 and 4 whereas Szpiro ﬁnds support
for a relative risk aversion coeﬃcient between 1.2 and 1.8, based on data on
property/liability insurance. In our simple scenario, we assume a relative risk
aversion coeﬃcient γ = 2, and investigate a number of alternative scenarios in
which we alter the initial wealth and other parameters.
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βij :=
πij
wij − µij
and rij :=
dij
πij
. (5)
We call βij the investment ratio for policyholder i in insurance period j. Under
the CRRA assumption, we can rewrite the decision rule (4) as3
pij(θi) <
U(1 + rijβij) − U(1)
U(1 + rijβij) − U(1 − βij)
.
In other words, for an arbitrary policyholder with a ﬁxed risk aversion coeﬃcient
γ, their decision to buy the add-on depends on three things: their individual
conditional probability of claim pij (θi), the ratio rij, and the investment ratio
βij.
If we further specialize to the case where the ratio rij is determined by the
insurer through (2) and the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient γ = 2, the decision
rule reduces to
pij(θi) < (1 − βij)pij. (6)
Thus in this simple scenario, as the entrance fee decreases and hence βij de-
creases, more policyholders will accept the add-on. Additionally, we see that
as long as a policyholder’s conditional probability of claim pij(θi) is less than
the average probability of claim pij, it is possible to ﬁnd an investment ratio at
which the policyholder will buy the add-on. However, we do not explore further
in this paper precisely how the add-on can act as a screening device. Instead,
we analyze the impact on the SSE of allowing the policyholders the choice to
buy the add-on, and how the SSE varies with diﬀerent investment ratios oﬀered
to the policyholders.
A Second Numerical Study
On the Danish data set of I = 8337 policyholders, we investigate three scenarios
for the selection of the investment ratio using the decision rule (6). First, all
policyholders are oﬀered the same investment ratio β. Next, each policyholder
is oﬀered the investment ratio which maximizes their individual expected util-
ity from the purchase of the add-on. Lastly, the policyholders are oﬀered an
entrance fee that is the same constant multiple of their standard insurance pre-
mium across all policyholders.
We use the regression method to calculate the premium for the standard
insurance contract. As before, the parameters are estimated from the data in
years 2001-2003. In particular, the (private) risk proﬁle θi of each policyholder
is taken to be their second last credibility estimate, based on the information in
years 2001-2003.
In the ﬁrst scenario, all policyholders are oﬀered the same investment ratio,
i.e. βi,2004 = β for all i. Thus policyholder i is oﬀered an add-on with entrance
fee πi,2004 = β(wi,2004 −µi,2004) and dividend di,2004 = ri,2004πi,2004. Note that,
under the decision rule (6), each policyholder evaluates the add-on based on β,
and not directly on the entrance fee πi,2004 or their initial wealth wi,2004. Figure
3 shows how many policyholders would choose to buy the add-on at diﬀerent
levels of β.
3We thank the referee for pointing out this approach.
13***Figure 3 about here***
Under the ﬁrst scenario, we ﬁnd which investment ratio β, oﬀered to all the
policyholders at the start of 2004, would have minimized the SSE at the end of
2004. Of course, this is not a method that an insurer could use a priori to select
the investment ratio. However, it does give us some insight into the potential
oﬀered by add-on. Since we do not know the wealth of each policyholder, the
analysis is done assuming that all policyholders start the year 2004 with the
same amount of wealth. The results are summarized in Table 4.
***Table 4 about here***
In Table 4, we see that the optimal constant investment ratio oﬀered to the entire
portfolio is decreasing as the initial wealth increases. The consequence is that
the SSE decreases as wealth increases, since each policyholder is bearing more
of their own risk. The increasing number of policyholders buying the add-on is
due to the decreasing β, under the assumption that the risk aversion coeﬃcient
remains constant. Notable is that, for β = 0.06203, the entrance fee is around
DKK 620 (ignoring the premium for the standard insurance contract, as it
varies between policyholders) and already we get an additional improvement in
the SSE of 81.79% compared going from the ﬂat rate to the regression estimator.
Just by adding individual choice!
The average experienced claim frequency in year 2004 for the policyholders
who buy an add-on at these portfolio optimal investment ratios is 18.84%, while
it is 22.65% for those who do not buy the add-on. As pij and pij(θi) are
estimated from the data in years 2001-2003, this means that the policyholders
who decide to buy the add-on continue to show lower risk in the year 2004.
In the next scenario, we suppose that the insurer oﬀers to each policyholder i
the investment ratio ˜ βi,2004 that maximizes their expected utility from the add-
on (i.e. the ˜ βi,2004 that maximizes the left-hand side of (4)). This means that
policyholder i is oﬀered an add-on with entrance fee πi,2004 = ˜ βi,2004(wi,2004 −
µi,2004) and dividend di,2004 = ri,2004πi,2004. If the decision rule (6) is satisﬁed
for this choice of the investment ratio ˜ βi,2004, then policyholder i will buy the
add-on. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the estimated values of the optimal
individual investment ratios ˜ βi,2004 across the data set.
***Figure 4 about here***
In total, 5246 policyholders will choose to buy the add-on at their individu-
ally optimal ˜ βi,2004. Table 5 shows the scaled SSE under diﬀerent assumptions
on the initial wealth, under this scenario.
***Table 5 about here***
We get an even better pricing method than in the ﬁrst scenario for all as-
sumptions on initial wealth. However, in practice, for policyholders with large
initial wealths, such as DKK 1 000 000, there should be some restrictions for
the entrance fee to be a good pricing method. For instance, a restriction could
be that the net dividend dij may not exceed the actuarial premium, or else
the SSE will increase as the dividend increases. For implementational reasons,
the insurer might oﬀer the policyholder with a stepwise function, instead of
14a continuum of eligible entrance fees. The precision of the function may de-
pend on the precision of risk perception of the policyholders and the costs of
implementation, systems maintenance and so on.
We ﬁnd that the average experienced claim frequency in year 2004 for those
policyholders who buy an add-on at their individually optimal investment ratio
˜ βi,2004 is 20.85%, while it is 21.00% for those who do not buy the add-on. Thus,
while policyholders who decide to buy the add-on continue to show lower risk
in the year 2004, the diﬀerence in risk is not as large as in the ﬁrst scenario, in
which all policyholders were oﬀered the same constant investment ratio.
In the last scenario, each policyholder is oﬀered an entrance fee which is
a proportion of their individual standard insurance premium. It is the same
scenario as in the subsection “A First Numerical Study”, except that now the
policyholders make a decision to accept the add-on or not. For some constant
k > 0, policyholder i is oﬀered an add-on with entrance fee πi,2004 = kµi,2004
and dividend di,2004 = ri,2004πi,2004. The motivation is that it might be easier to
relate to the insurance premium than the initial wealth, for both the policyholder
and the insurer. The proportion k is chosen as the one which would have
minimized the SSE at the end of year 2004. Table 6 shows the results, assuming
all policyholders have the same initial wealth.
***Table 6 about here***
The scaled SSEs in Table 6 are less than under the no-claims BMS method
(whose scaled SSE is 0.9828; see Table 2), except at an initial wealth wi,2004 =
10000. The performance is improving as the initial wealth increases, but so is
the entrance fee.
Generally the SSE is somewhat higher than in the other two scenarios, for the
same initial wealth (compare Table 6 with Table 4 and Table 5). In spite of this,
the number of policyholders buying the add-on is larger than in the scenario in
which all policyholders were oﬀered the same investment ratio (compare Table
6 with Table 4).
The average experienced claim frequency in year 2004 for those policyholders
who buy an add-on when the proportion k is chosen as the one which gives the
lowest SSE is 18.79%, while it is 23.16% for those who do not buy the add-on.
That is, the policyholders who decide to buy the add-on continue to show lower
risk in the year 2004.
CONCLUSION
We have proposed an alternative way to turn a problem of asymmetric informa-
tion into a solution of how to price insurance in groups with heterogeneous risk.
The design of the proposed add-on can vary in many ways. Both the criterion
of getting a dividend and the size of the dividend can easily be modiﬁed to suit
a speciﬁc business line or area. For instance, no-claims are neither common nor
relevant as a criterion for policyholders in areas with a high claim frequency,
such as glass insurance within commercial transport. There, a criterion based
on a bound on the number or cost of claims, either ﬁxed or in relation to the
expectation, might be more appropriate. However, as our intention has been to
keep the model as simple and as descriptive as possible in this paper, we kept
the criterion of no-claims.
15The size of the entrance fee will be a strategic decision based on either poli-
cyholder insight or the business strategy of the insurer, or by the policyholders
themselves. We have showed that there might be both entrance fees and divi-
dends that exist at realistic levels.
Under the assumptions made, we have found that each policyholder has an
optimal entrance fee, depending on their initial wealth, individual risk proﬁle
and risk aversion. Since the insurer usually does not know the initial wealth or
risk aversion of each individual, the insurer may let the policyholder choose the
size of the entrance fee in order to get the optimal eﬀect of the self-selection
mechanism when pricing insurance. The higher the number of choices oﬀered
to the individual, the larger becomes the price-coverage diﬀerentiation, thereby
increasing the competitiveness of the insurance product, due to fair pricing.
However, the add-on will become less eﬀective as a screening device. The more
the price is diﬀerentiated, the less the add-on separates the policyholders into
groups of buyers or not, and vice versa.
Although the one-period add-on analyzed in this paper is close to a clas-
sical BMS, its generalization to a multi-period add-on opens up avenues for
further developments. Our approach is an alternative to a BMS, rather than
a re-formulation of it, with a direct link to revealing a customer’s asymmet-
ric information. Exploring the pricing and eﬃciency of a multi-period add-on
contract is a topic for future research.
The main conclusion of this paper is that the potential of the add-on in-
creases with freedom of individual choice, while the eﬃciency is limited to the
self-awareness of the individuals. But the most applicable conclusion is that by
giving the policyholder an individually-set contingent payment based on their
expected risk, instead of a collective ﬁxed bonus rate, we get a fairer and more
competitive pricing system.
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18TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE 1 Claims summary of the data set
Year J
2001 2002 2003 2004 PI
i=1
PJ
j=2001 nij 1604 3381 5264 7007
PI
i=1
PJ
j=2001 ˆ νij 1644 3441 5264 6969
PI
i=1 1
hPJ
j=2001 nij = 0
i
7128 6058 5165 4531
PI
i=1 1
hPJ
j=2001 nij <
PJ
j=2001 ˆ νij
i
7128 6068 5365 5153
Note: Cumulative number of experienced claims, cumulative number of
expected claims, the number of policyholders with no claims, and the num-
ber of policyholders with fewer claims than expected, for each year of the
period 2001-2004 for the data set of I = 8337 policyholders. The actual
and expected number of claims by policyholder i in year j is denoted nij
and ˆ νij, respectively, and 1 denotes the zero-one indicator function.
TABLE 2 Pricing precision of various pricing methods
Pricing Scaled SSE Relative improvement
method l Description =
SSE(l,2004)
SSE(2,2004) =
SSE(l,2004)−SSE(2,2004)
SSE(2,2004)−SSE(1,2004)
1 Flat rate 1.0324 N/A
2 Regression 1.0000 1.0000
3 Credibility 0.9918 0.2531
4 No-claims BMS 0.9828 0.5309
5 Add-on 0.3634 19.6482
Note: Scaled SSE for each pricing method and the increase in the SSE over
the regression method, relative to the improvement in the SSE by moving from
the ﬂat rate method to the regression method, for the year 2004. The actual
SSE (2,2004) = 2360.
TABLE 3 Wealth at the end of insurance period j
Decision
Conditional Buy insurance Buy insurance
Event probability without add-on with add-on
Nij > 0 pij(θi) wij − µij wij − µij − πij
Nij = 0 1 − pij(θi) wij − µij wij − µij + dij
Note: The wealth at the end of insurance period j depends on the
decision to buy the add-on or not, and whether the policyholder
has no-claims or not, assuming a null discount rate.
19TABLE 4 Pricing precision with optimal constant investment ratio
Initial wealth wi,2004 in DKK
10000 20000 50000 100000 1000000
Optimal constant β 0.06203 0.06226 0.06188 0.05431 0.01395
SSE(5,2004)/SSE(2,2004) 0.9735 0.9483 0.8804 0.7866 0.5534
SSE(5,2004)−SSE(2,2004)
SSE(2,2004)−SSE(1,2004) 0.8179 1.5957 3.6914 6.5864 13.7840
Number of buyers of add-on 3679 3670 3687 4078 5147
Note: Optimal investment ratio if all policyholders are proposed with the same investment
ratio and are assumed to have the same risk aversion coeﬃcient γ = 2 and the same initial
wealth wi,2004. The optimal investment ratio is the one which minimizes the SSE. The
values of SSE(2,2004) and SSE(1,2004) are derived from Table 2.
TABLE 5 Pricing precision with individually optimal investment ratio
Initial wealth wi,2004 in DKK
10000 20000 50000 100000 1000000
SSE(5,2004)/SSE(2,2004) 0.9707 0.9427 0.8659 0.7623 0.4125
SSE(5,2004)−SSE(2,2004)
SSE(2,2004)−SSE(1,2004) 0.9043 1.7685 4.1389 7.3364 18.1327
Number of buyers of add-on 5246 5246 5246 5246 5246
Note: Scaled SSE when the estimated value of the optimal investment ratio ˜ βi,2004 of
each individual is used as entrance fee, and each policyholder is assumed to have the
same initial wealth wi,2004 and risk aversion coeﬃcient γ = 2. The number of buyers
of the add-on is constant, as their optimal investment ratio is independent of wealth.
The values of SSE(2,2004) and SSE(1,2004) are derived from Table 2.
TABLE 6 Pricing precision with entrance fee a multiple of the individual
annual insurance premium
Initial wealth wi,2004 in DKK
10000 20000 50000 100000 1000000
ˆ πi,2004/ˆ µ
(2)
i,2004 0.06366 0.2851 0.8576 1.605 3.566
SSE(5,2004)/SSE(2,2004) 0.9837 0.9560 0.8948 0.8147 0.6046
SSE(5,2004)−SSE(2,2004)
SSE(2,2004)−SSE(1,2004) 0.5031 1.3580 3.2469 5.7191 12.2037
Number of buyers of add-on 4781 4147 4010 4178 5148
Note: Scaled SSE for diﬀerent initial wealth wi,2004, when the entrance fee is a multiple
of the individual annual insurance premium. The multiple is the same for each policy-
holder across the data set, while the annual insurance premium is individual. Here, the
policyholders choose individually whether to accept the add-on or not. The values of
SSE(2,2004) and SSE(1,2004) are derived from Table 2.
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Note: As we use (2) to calculate the dividend di,2004, then by (5)
ri,2004 = pi,2004/(1 − pi,2004) for policyholder i.
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Note: Here the entrance fee of policyholder i is calculated as πi,2004 = kˆ µ
(2)
i,2004,
for k ∈ {0,1/12,2/12,...,5} and all policyholders are assumed to accept the
add-on. The circles in the ﬁgure show the scaled SSE of the add-on contract in
the year 2004 for diﬀerent values of k. The minimum scaled SSE occurs at
k = 3.357. The horizontal line is the scaled SSE of the no-claims BMS
method. For an entrance fee of 1
12ˆ µ
(2)
i,2004 or more, the SSE is lower for the
add-on than for the no-claims BMS method, in the investigated range.
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Note: The number of policyholders who would buy the add-on based on the
decision rule (6), as the constant investment ratio β oﬀered to all policyholders
increases.
23FIGURE 4 Distribution of the estimated values of the individually optimal
investment ratio ˜ βi,2004
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Note: There are 3091 policyholders who will decide to not accept the add-on,
regardless of the oﬀered investment ratio, as the estimated value of their
conditional probability of claims pi,2004(θi) is greater than the estimated value
of their unconditional probability pi,2004 (recall decision rule (6)). The optimal
investment ratio for these policyholders is set to zero.
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